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The Politics-Bureaucracy Interface in Developing Countries 
 
The political-bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest 
and debate going back to Woodrow Wilson’s work on the characteristics of political 
and administrative spheres in 1887 (Peters and Pierre, 2001; Svara, 2006; Peters, 
2010; Overeem, 2012; Jacobsen, 2006). This debate centers on the respective roles of 
politicians and administrators in the policy process and the nature of the relationship 
between them. It has significant practical implications for policymaking, and as such, 
continues to fuel academic interest (Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Georgiou, 2014)1. Yet 
studies on the politics-bureaucracy relationship have tended to focus almost 
exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies (Gulrajani and Moloney, 2012). 
Despite the importance of the politics-bureaucracy relation for policymaking, there 
has been very little attention given to the relationship between politicians and top 
bureaucrats in developing countries, and how this relationship might shape the 
development process. This can be seen in Georgiou’s (2014) recent ‘atlas of the 
politics-administration dichotomy’, which provides a review of the literature on the 
topic, and in doing so highlights the lack of attention given to the politics-bureaucracy 
relationship in developing countries. 
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of the politics-bureaucracy interface 
in the development process. A growing literature considers the process of reform in 
developing countries, pointing to the importance of political-bureaucratic interactions 
in reform processes (Tendler, 1997; Grindle, 2004; Melo et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013; 
Levy, 2014). This research highlights the extent to which the politics-bureaucracy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Bureaucrat’ in this paper refers to non-elective government officials involved in government 
administration and is used interchangeably with ‘administrator’ and ‘civil servant’. 
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relationship in many developing countries differs from the Weberian ideal. 
Furthermore, it points to the substantial differences in the nature of the politics-
administrative interface across developing nations. The civil service in many 
developing countries ‘has power rivaling that of the political establishment’ (Grindle 
and Thomas, 1991: 60-61), while in others, by contrast, governance is hindered by the 
absence of a coherent bureaucracy (Evans, 1992). In such cases, the Weberian model 
bears little resemblance to the realities of political-bureaucratic engagement. 
However, despite these lessons, there has so far been little systematic analysis of the 
types of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries.  
We address this gap in the literature by providing a systematic overview of the 
politics-bureaucracy relationship in developing countries. The politics-bureaucracy 
interface is defined as the particular forms in which politicians and bureaucrats 
engage with one another and the factors that shape this engagement. If we consider 
the fact that politicians and bureaucrats have the authority and capability to initiate, 
design, adopt, implement and regulate policy in different areas, then we would be 
sympathetic towards the idea that a ‘politically informed’ approach to development 
requires an understanding of the nature of the politics-bureaucracy relationship in a 
country, how the relationship might change, and what factors are associated with this 
relationship. 
TYPES OF POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS 
In this section we introduce four models of political-bureaucratic relations. These 
models are based on two dimensions along which the relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats can be conceptualized: separation and autonomy, drawing on Svara 
(2006). Separation refers to the extent to which political and administrative spheres 
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are formally distinct. In some contexts, the roles and responsibilities of politicians and 
bureaucrats are clearly demarcated, while in others, there is considerable overlap in 
the roles of each and a lack of clear assignment of responsibilities. Roles refer to the 
‘functions that an official performs’, which includes setting the policy agenda, 
implementing policy, allocating resources, managing resources and so forth (Svara, 
2006). 
-   Insert Table 1 about here -  
Where there is high role separation (intrusive and integrated models), these different 
functions are clearly assigned to politicians and bureaucrats. A high level of 
separation between political and administrative spheres is associated with a rule-of-
law-oriented politically neutral civil service, as per the Weberian ideal, and is often 
present in more democratic political systems. In this type of system, the 
administrative sphere acts as the implementing arm of the elected officials. In doing 
so, bureaucrats must act in accordance to political demands while ensuring neutrality 
in policy implementation. Where there is low role separation (collusive and 
collaborative models) both sets of officials perform these various functions, which 
dilutes responsibilities among politicians and bureaucrats. In these cases, while 
bureaucrats must still ensure that policies are provided on an equal basis to all 
citizens, their political neutrality is not presupposed. 
Autonomy refers to the extent to which bureaucrats have the space or freedom to go 
about performing the functions they are assigned without political interference 
(Aucoin, 1990). In contexts where there is low bureaucratic autonomy (intrusive and 
collusive models), bureaucrats are subordinate to politicians in carrying out their 
roles. Political leaders generally have a number of policy objectives or mandates they 
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seek to achieve. Where a bureaucracy has high autonomy, these mandates tend to be 
fewer in number and more general, providing the bureaucracy the necessary space to 
work out the details of how these policy objectives can be achieved (Fukuyama, 
2013). Where there is low bureaucratic autonomy, we may see situations where 
mandates provided by political leaders establish detailed rules, with bureaucrats 
provided no independence or discretion on how to carry out the mandate.  
Bureaucratic autonomy is a key component of high-quality governance (Huntington, 
2006). As Fukuyama (2013: 359) notes, ‘a high degree of autonomy is what permits 
innovation, experimentation and risk taking in the bureaucracy’. This innovation and 
experimentation has been central to the development process. Bureaucratic autonomy 
was essential to the transformation of the East Asian ‘developmental states’, such as 
South Korea and Singapore. Furthermore, excessive bureaucratic subordination is 
typically a key reason for poor or predatory governance (Evans, 1992).  
The difference between separation and autonomy is that the former refers to the types 
of functions politicians and bureaucrats perform, and the latter refers to how 
bureaucrats can perform the functions they have been assigned.  Hence, while both 
integrated and collaborative models have a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy, 
they differ in terms of the types of functions politicians and bureaucrats perform. In 
the former, political leaders set the broad policy directives and civil servants provide 
policy options based on these directives and advise ministers on the feasibility, 
strengths, and weaknesses of the different policy options. Civil servants are also 
responsible for policy implementation. In the collaborative model, in contrast, senior 
bureaucrats are often responsible for the actual setting of policy directives.  
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It is important to point out that the typology presented is based on broad 
categorizations; the types of relations between politicians and administrators in reality 
is more blurred, often varying across levels of governance. As such, there are likely to 
be countries that do not precisely fit one of the four models presented. It is also 
important to note that the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is not 
fixed; these relationships change over time according to broader political and 
economic factors, or due to factors directly linked to a country’s civil service. We 
discuss changes in political-bureaucratic relations following our discussion of the four 
basic models.  
Collaborative Model 
The collaborative model is characterized by low role separation between political and 
bureaucratic elites, with high levels of bureaucratic autonomy. It is particularly 
associated with developmental states – governments that actively promote 
socioeconomic development through market-oriented policies – such as the East 
Asian Tigers (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1992), Botswana (Leftwich, 1995; 
Taylor, 2005), and more recently China (Baek, 2005; Knight, 2014). The close 
relationship between political and bureaucratic elites, together with the autonomy 
given to a highly skilled and meritocratic bureaucracy, is seen as central to the use of 
industrial policy in the developmental states that led to economic transformation 
(Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995).  
A key feature of the collaborative model is the unusually high degree of influence that 
bureaucrats have in the policy process. This has meant the successful use of industrial 
policy in these states is largely attributed to key economic ministries (Johnson, 1982). 
There are several fundamental characteristics of the collaborative model: 
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•   Core group or ‘cadre’ of developmental elites consisting of senior politicians 
and bureaucrats. 
•   Unusually high degree of bureaucratic influence in proposal and design of 
policies.  
•   An esprit de corps among the political and bureaucratic elites based on 
development objectives. 
•   Shared class and education backgrounds of political and bureaucratic elites. 
•   Coherent and meritocratic bureaucracies. 
•   Movement between bureaucratic and political positions.  
•   Bureaucracy subsumed within dominant political party.  
The collaborative model of political-bureaucratic relations associated with 
developmental states is noted for the presence of ‘a small cadre of developmentally-
determined senior politicians and bureaucrats, usually close to the executive head of 
government’, which establishes the principles of the regime (Leftwich, 1995: 405). 
The close working relationship between political and bureaucratic elites facilitates the 
unusually high degree of influence bureaucrats have in making policy in this system. 
Indeed, the bureaucracy in developmental states is often seen to have been in charge 
of the day-to-day running of the country. Politicians often act more like judges or 
referees, in that they tend to arbitrate and mediate in the policymaking process, rather 
than taking a more interventionist role (Charlton, 1991; Evans, 1992; Leftwich, 1995). 
It is, however, important to note that bureaucrats have this high degree of influence 
because the political leadership decides this should be the case (see Charlton, 1991). 
In other words, the level of autonomy bureaucrats have is generally determined by the 
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political leadership; there are very few examples of systems in which administrators 
dominate politicians.2  
The close relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is fostered by a set of 
shared values and objectives that enables politicians to delegate far more 
responsibility to bureaucrats. The notion of an esprit de corps among politicians and 
bureaucrats based on achieving development objectives is a feature of virtually all 
accounts of developmental states (Wade, 1990; Charlton, 1991; Evans, 1992; 
Leftwich, 1995). Rothstein (2015) discusses this in the context of China’s ‘cadre 
administration’, where bureaucrats have high levels of commitment to the ‘policy 
doctrine’ of the bureaucracy.3 In many developmental states, the similar class and/or 
higher education backgrounds of politicians and bureaucrats facilitated the 
development of an esprit de corps (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1992). 
In addition to these shared values, the bureaucracy is often subsumed within the 
dominant political party.4 This means the bureaucracy in the collaborative model is 
not impartial or politically neutral, as per the Weberian ideal. Indeed, as Saxena 
describes in the case of Singapore following independence, the People’s Action Party 
government, ‘did not appreciate political neutrality; instead it expected the civil 
service to be aligned to its vision’ (2011: 38). This politicized nature of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fukuyama (2013: 358) provides the examples of Imperial Germany before World War I and Japan before 
World War II as cases where bureaucrats had full autonomy and dominated politicians, particularly with 
regard to their military services. Indeed, one could argue that military coups across the developing world 
represent examples of administrators taking power from politicians. We do not consider this issue here – 
instead, we limit our focus to civilian bureaucracies. 
3 Rothstein’s (2014) discussion of China’s ‘cadre administration’ focuses on the characteristics of China’s 
public administration, rather than the relationship between politicians and administrators. He argues that 
instead of a commitment to a political ideology, such as Marxist-Leninism, China’s cadre administration is 
now characterized by an adherence to specific policies in areas such as healthcare and education. 
4 Most developmental states have been autocratic, although governance in these states tends to be more 
party-based rather than a powerful individual leader (Leftwich, 1995). Even in more democratic 
developmental states, such as Botswana, one political party tends to dominate.  
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bureaucracy is further demonstrated by the frequent movement of senior bureaucrats 
into political office – a feature of most developmental states (Leftwich, 1995).  
Bureaucracies in the collaborative model have the Weberian characteristics of being 
coherent and meritocratic, which contributes to the high level of bureaucratic 
autonomy. Bureaucracies in developmental states are widely noted for being able to 
attract the country’s best graduates. On entering the public administration these 
officials tend to adhere to the bureaucracy’s established objectives, rules, and norms, 
with their career progression based on performance against these standards (Wade, 
1990; Evans, 1992).  
Collusive Model 
A close relationship between political and bureaucratic elites based on low role 
separation is also a feature of patrimonial or predatory states. However, in these 
countries, political-bureaucratic relations are based on a collusive model, where 
bureaucratic autonomy is low, and sometimes virtually non-existent. This collusive 
relationship fosters patronage networks used to extract rents. This can be seen in 
predatory states, such as Zimbabwe (Dashwood, 2000). It is also associated with some 
more democratic countries, such as Mexico, where politics is dominated by a 
patronage system (Grindle, 2012). There are several characteristics of the collusive 
model: 
•   Control of the state apparatus is vested in a small group of politicians and 
bureaucrats connected through personalistic ties.  
•   Those in key political and administrative positions have access to the major 
means of acquiring personal wealth in the country.  
	   10	  
•   The government bureaucracy is used primarily for rent-seeking purposes. 
•   Employment in the bureaucracy is based on loyalty to politicians leading to 
large and inefficient bureaucracies.  
Much of the research on patrimonial states has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
‘overgrown’ bureaucracies incorporated into rent-seeking governments and the 
pervasive corruption that follow are widely seen as a central cause of the post-
independence economic stagnation across the continent (Bates, 1994). This has 
frequently led to a focus on reducing the size of bureaucracies in the countries. The 
problem, however, is more to do with the lack of bureaucratic autonomy, as Evans 
(1992: 151) notes in the case of Zaire under Mobutu’s leadership, where it was ‘not 
that the bureaucracy impedes development so much as the absence of a coherent 
bureaucratic apparatus.’ 
A principal feature of the collusive model is that employment in the bureaucracy is 
based on personal or political loyalty. All bureaucracies (in developed and developing 
countries) have some political appointments. However, in the collusive model this 
tends to be the norm. As Grindle (2012) argues, this difference can be seen in the 
nature of the contract between employer and employee. The patronage system in the 
collusive model means that this contract is based on a personal or political loyalty to 
an individual. In systems with an institutionalized civil service, this contract tends to 
be between an individual and an institution. It is also worth noting that because there 
are often political factions and conflicts within patronage systems – such systems are 
‘often quite messy’ (Grindle, 2012: 20).  
Intrusive Model 
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The intrusive model has a much higher degree of separation between political and 
administrative spheres than the previous two models. This is linked to the presence of 
more rule-of-law-oriented politically neutral bureaucracies – often established during 
colonial rule, as in the case of India. While there is high role separation between 
politicians and bureaucrats, levels of bureaucratic autonomy are often low due to 
political interference in the day-to-day work of civil servants.  
The intrusive model is often present in more democratic developing countries, such as 
India and Brazil. However, it is important to note that there is significant variation in 
the types of political systems in states characterized by the intrusive model; the 
intrusive model is not restricted to democratic systems. The relationship between 
political and bureaucratic elites also tends to be more heterogeneous – varying across 
countries and within countries (according to different ministries). There are several 
factors associated with the intrusive model: 
•   Bureaucratic power and procedures often strongly influenced by colonial 
systems. 
•   More rule-of-law-based politically neutral bureaucracy 
•   More frequent political change linked to competitive elections. 
•   Significant political interference in bureaucratic work, particularly in 
recruitment and career progression in the bureaucracy. 
•   Other actors in society influence policymaking.  
The low bureaucratic autonomy in the intrusive model differs from the collaborative 
model. Countries with intrusive relations often have bureaucracies established during 
colonial rule. At independence, the civil service was often the most powerful 
institution because colonial powers generally developed the bureaucracy at the 
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expense of other political institutions – particularly, political parties – in order to 
maintain law and order (Smith, 2009; Wallis, 1989; Riggs, 1963). As such, the lack of 
bureaucratic autonomy in these contexts is often the result of power struggles between 
political and bureaucratic elites. Politicians have generally been able to assert their 
control over the civil service. This control often occurs through political interference 
in civil service recruitment and promotions, as Ayee (2013) discusses in the case of 
Ghana. Bureaucracies do, however, attempt to resist such political control. Many 
countries with intrusive political-bureaucratic relations have institutional checks in 
place to limit political interference in civil service recruitment and promotion, as we 
discuss in more detail below. This is an important difference between the intrusive 
and collusive model.5  
Much of the research on bureaucracies in development focuses on the intrusive 
model. This research suggests that a key issue at the root of the tension between 
political leaders and the bureaucracy in these countries is that the development needs 
of these countries meant that political leaders sought political and economic 
transformation of the country. The colonially established civil services, however, 
were unresponsive to such demands because they were concerned more with 
following procedure and maintain the status quo in these societies (Dwivedi, 1999; 
Brett, 2009). As Hirschmann (1999: 291) notes, the bureaucratic elites in these 
countries turned out to be ‘rather conservative and process-oriented, and very 
defensive about the possibility of losing their economic security and social status in a 
fragile political situation.’6 However, it is important to note that tensions between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is demonstrated in the difference between Brazil, which has an intrusive model, and Mexico, which 
has a more collusive model. As Grindle (2012: 148-9) explains, Brazil has a very high level of merit-based 
hiring in the bureaucracy; in contrast, Mexico has a relatively low level of meritocratic recruitment.  
6 Much of the development administration literature that emerged in the 1960s focused on transforming this 
colonial bureaucracy into a more development-centered public administration (Dwivedi, 1999).  
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politicians and bureaucrats in these countries may also arise because political elites 
undermine civil service procedures for rent-seeking purposes.  
Competitive elections are also an important feature of many countries with intrusive 
political-bureaucratic relations.7 This tends to mean that politicians have much shorter 
tenures than career civil servants, which provides greater incentives for bureaucrats to 
obstruct political mandates as those issuing these mandates may only be in power 
until the next election. Often, a breakdown in political-bureaucratic relations is linked 
to political change. After a period of one-party domination, there may be a lack of 
trust between new political leaders and the bureaucracy because the bureaucracy is 
associated with the previous regime (Everest-Phillips, 2013). Furthermore, the more 
open nature of political systems in many of these countries means that additional 
actors, such as elite classes, unions, civil society, and donors, influence policymaking 
and political-bureaucratic interactions.  
Integrated Model 
The integrated model of political-bureaucratic relations is characterized by clear role 
separation between politicians and bureaucrats, and high bureaucratic autonomy. This 
model is associated with advanced democracies, such as the UK and the USA, which 
have strong political institutions. There are several key characteristics: 
•   Clear separation of roles and hierarchy between politicians and bureaucrats. 
•   Primary responsibility of bureaucrats is to advise political leaders and 
implement decisions made by these leaders. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Indeed, Ayee’s (2013) description of the politicization of the public service in Ghana occurred following 
the country’s return to democracy, highlighting the link between democracy and intrusive political-
bureaucratic relations. 
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•   Rule-of-law based politically neutral civil service.  
•   Meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the bureaucracy.  
These characteristics are generally in line with the Weberian ideal, which tends to be 
the normative ideal in Western societies characterized by an integrated model, rather 
than necessarily being the reality of political-administrative relations (Hansen and 
Ejersbo, 2002). Bureaucracies in many advanced democracies are actually far more 
politicized than the Weberian ideal, and the separation of political and administrative 
roles may at times be unclear (Svara, 2006).  
As such, it is important to note that there are significant differences in political-
bureaucratic relations among countries characterized by the integrated model. Indeed, 
Svara (2006) differentiates between countries within this group according to 
differences in role separation and bureaucratic autonomy. The key point, though, is 
that while there may be differences among countries within the integrated model, the 
within-group differences are substantially lower than differences with countries that 
have other political-administrative models. For example, while the USA may have a 
higher proportion of political appointments in the bureaucracy than the UK, in both 
countries the bureaucracy is broadly based on principles of merit and political 
neutrality. This differs considerably from countries in the collusive model where 
appointment based on political loyalty is institutionalized (Grindle, 2012).8  
TRANSFORMING POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It is worth noting that the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) based reforms in a number of 
advanced democracies has changed the relationship between politicians and administrators considerably. A 
detailed discussion of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, broadly-speaking, these	  
reforms have led to a more market contract-like relationship between ministers – the purchasers of goods 
and services – and ministries and other public or private entities – the suppliers of goods and services 
(Schick, 1998). It is also worth noting that some argue NPM is being replaced in some developed 
democracies by information technology centred governance (see Dunleavy et al., 2005).	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In considering models of political-bureaucratic relations in developing countries, an 
important question that arises is how do states move from one model of political-
bureaucratic relations to another? Governance reforms promoted by donors in recent 
decades have, to a significant degree, attempted to transform the relationship between 
politicians and civil servants. These efforts, however, have frequently ended in 
failure, demonstrating the need to better understand how change happens.  
All states have at some point in time had public services based on patronage systems 
with collusive political-bureaucratic relations. A number of scholars, most notably 
Grindle (2012), have examined how countries have gone from having patronage 
systems to merit-based civil service systems considering historic and contemporary 
cases. In most cases change occurred as a result of political entrepreneurs working 
strategically with like-minded reformists to bring civil service reform. The way this 
change was introduced varied across different contexts. In some countries it was 
through top-down initiatives from political leaders, in others it was the result of elite 
settlements, or competition among political parties. Even after reforms were adopted, 
patronage often continued, and so ensuring reforms were implemented required 
further strategic political action in the post-reform period. Therefore, in most cases 
change occurred ‘slowly and gradually’ (Grindle, 2012: 9). 
Most donor-promoted governance reforms have sought to move countries to the 
integrated model of political-bureaucratic relations, often bringing in aspects of 
general management theories, based on the New Public Management (NPM) 
approach. While the aim of bringing widespread private sector managerial practices 
into the public sector has influenced governments across the globe, its effects have 
often been questioned (Pollit, 2006; Dunleavy and Hood, 2009). One reason that such 
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efforts have produced disappointing results is because they failed to consider the 
limitations of markets and the private sectors in these countries. Following 
independence, the absence of a strong domestic private sector in most countries meant 
the bureaucracy was the main instrument of economic development (Hirschmann, 
1999). This also meant the bureaucracy became the major source of employment in 
many developing countries. Therefore, change in the nature of political-bureaucratic 
relations is linked to the relative strength of the private sector. As Schick (1998: 129) 
points out, ‘progress in the public sector requires parallel advances in the market 
sector.’  
This is demonstrated in the case of developmental states with collaborative political-
bureaucratic relations. The development success of these countries is linked to the 
success of the political leadership and key economic ministries in implementing 
policies that strengthened the private sector in these countries (Wade, 1990). 
Furthermore, in many developmental contexts, such as Japan and China, political 
leaders sought to incentivize bureaucrats to implement strategies to strengthen the 
private sector by allowing senior bureaucrats to retire early and join the private sector 
(Johnson, 1982; Li, 1998). The development of a strong private sector has also led to 
change in political-bureaucratic relations. Effectively, it has meant that the 
bureaucracy is no longer needed to be driver of economic development, and as such 
the process of development has meant that these states, particularly those in East Asia, 
have moved from collaborative relations towards the integrated model (Cheung, 
2005). 
It is important to note that there are limitations associated with the collaborative 
model. The close relationship between political and bureaucratic elites has meant that 
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corruption has been a major issue (Evans, 1992; Kang, 2002). Furthermore, while 
there are examples of democratic developmental states, most have been autocratic, 
which has meant the public has had little voice in the policy process, and political 
opposition has often been suppressed (Leftwich, 1995). Perhaps the most important 
lesson is that change occurs slowly and gradually, and the trajectory of change varies 
significantly, depending on specific country contexts. Therefore, it is important to 
move away from trying to move countries to an integrated model using extensive 
reforms implemented quickly, towards better understanding how gradual and 
incremental changes in the politics-bureaucracy interface can better enable politicians 
and bureaucrats to respond to the development requirements of a specific context. 
Building this understanding requires further research on specific parts of the politics-
bureaucracy interface in developing countries.  
In looking at how the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in a country 
may change, it is worth considering the principal factors shaping the political-
bureaucratic relationship in developing countries. These issues shed light on 
differences across political-bureaucratic models and what the sources of change or 
continuity in particular political-bureaucratic relationship may be. A wide range of 
context-specific factors will influence the nature of political-bureaucratic engagement 
in a given country; however, drawing on empirical analyses of governance and reform 
processes in poorer nations (e.g. Evans 1992; Tendler 1997; Hirschmann, 1999; 
Grindle, 2004; 2012; Melo et al., 2013; Levy, 2014), we identify four issues that 
consistently influence political-bureaucratic relations. These are a) resources; b) 
recruitment and career progression; c) representativeness; and d) values, interests and 
motivations. 
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Resources 
Political-bureaucratic interactions are strongly influenced by the resources that each 
set of officials can draw on. By resources, we refer to the sources of power available 
to politicians and bureaucrats that enable each to influence decision-making. 
Hirschmann (1999: 289) argues development organizations often overlook the 
influence bureaucrats have on development programmes because they fail to consider 
the resources the bureaucracy has at its disposal, such as ‘legal authority and informal 
administrative power based on relative expertise, permanency and influence over 
policy formulation and implementation.’ There are three main types of resource: 
institutional, informational, and financial.  
A country’s political institutions allocate power and position to political and 
bureaucratic elites, providing the framework for interactions, determining the 
representation of interests in the decision-making process, and establishing the rules 
and norms by which political and bureaucratic spheres are governed. Political 
institutions establish a hierarchy between politicians and bureaucrats, with the former 
holding the overall decision-making authority. Political leaders can ignore the advice 
of bureaucrats, and often have the power to appoint and remove administrators, as 
Ayee (2013) explains in the Ghanaian context.  
Bureaucrats can also draw on institutional resources. The constitutions of many 
developing countries offer bureaucrats protection from excessive political 
interference. This particularly relates to laws that protect bureaucrats against dismissal 
from ministers, which tend to lead to political-bureaucratic relations based on the 
integrated or intrusive model. Despite the original intentions of such laws, there is 
evidence to suggest that their effects to safeguard bureaucrats in case of dispute with 
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politicians differs across counties (McCourt and Eldrige, 2003). Limited terms for 
political leaders also limit political overreach, and so bureaucrats tend to have much 
longer tenures than political leaders who are in office for much shorter time periods.  
Beyond these broad effects, variations in countries’ political institutions produce 
significant differences in the nature of political-bureaucratic interactions. For 
example, relations are influenced by whether a country is democratic or not. In 
democracies politicians may be less willing to follow bureaucratic advice if there are 
political costs that may jeopardize reelection. As we have discussed, in democracies, 
politicians also tend to have shorter tenures than bureaucrats, providing greater 
incentives for bureaucrats to obstruct political mandates on the basis that there may be 
a change in leadership after an election. Political-bureaucratic interactions can also 
vary according to parliamentary or presidential systems. As legislators in 
parliamentary systems have ultimate authority over the cabinet and bureaucracy, they 
may be more willing to provide bureaucrats with greater autonomy than in 
presidential systems, where legislators may be concerned with the possibility of the 
president using the bureaucracy in ways that go against legislators’ interests (Eaton, 
2000; see also Cowhey and McCubbins, 1995). 9  In addition to formal political 
institutions, informal institutions also shape political-bureaucratic relations. 10  For 
example, in Japan, the Amakudari – an unwritten rule that retiring state bureaucrats 
were awarded high-level positions in private corporations – helped foster 
collaborative ties between politicians and bureaucrats (Johnson, 1982; Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although as Eaton (2000) points out, the autonomy of bureaucrats is not uniform across different 
parliamentary and presidential systems. 
10 Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 725) define informal institutions as ‘rules of the game’ that structure 
political life ‘created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.’  
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The second type of resource that is seen to shape the politics-bureaucracy relationship 
is informational resources, which broadly refers to knowledge and expertise about 
different aspects of the political and policymaking process. The information 
asymmetry between politicians and bureaucrats that arises from bureaucratic expertise 
has been the subject of considerable academic attention (see Moe, 2006). As Weber 
(1968) explained, expertise represents the principal source of power for 
bureaucracies, and can be at the root of conflict between politicians and bureaucrats – 
a conflict between hierarchy and expertise. This is especially so in developing 
countries characterized by the intrusive model, where bureaucrats are ‘often said to 
monopolize the knowledge and expertise relevant to government’ (Smith, 2009: 135).  
The policy expertise of bureaucrats is also an important factor in the collaborative 
model of political-bureaucratic relations. The high level of bureaucratic knowledge 
and expertise is the basis of the significant influence that bureaucrats have on the 
policy process. As the developmental states literature highlights, the key economic 
ministries in many of these countries attracted the best graduates (Johnson 1982; 
Wade 1990; Evans 1992). It is, however, important not to overlook the expertise that 
politicians may have. This includes knowledge of the broader political context and of 
specific policy issues, which will shape their interactions with bureaucrats. Chung 
(1989), for example, finds the influence of presidents and bureaucrats in South 
Korea’s decision-making process depended largely on the extent of presidents’ 
knowledge of a specific issue.11  
Yet the precise nature of the relationship between bureaucratic expertise and political-
bureaucratic interactions is somewhat unclear. Knowledge and expertise is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is worth noting that the extent to which expertise provides bureaucrats influence is likely to vary 
across different sectors.  
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characteristic of the bureaucracy in all of the models except the collusive model. 
Furthermore, there is very little empirical analysis of how bureaucratic expertise 
influences the politics-bureaucracy relationship – particularly on how changes in 
levels of expertise impact interactions between politicians and administrators.12 The 
third resource influencing political-bureaucratic relations is financial resources. This 
is control over material resources between politicians and bureaucrats. In general, 
political leaders’ greater control over a country’s resources ensures greater 
responsiveness by bureaucrats to their demands.  
Ministries and agencies that have access to external funds are likely to have greater 
autonomy from political leaders than those entirely dependent on the central 
government for funding.13 As such, aid provided to specific ministries may redress 
power imbalances in the politics-bureaucracy relationship. However, there are 
significant limitations to such external funding, particularly as there is danger of 
donor-funded agencies becoming more accountable to external donors than to citizens 
and elected officials (Hirschmann, 1999).  
Recruitment and Career Progression 
Meritocratic recruitment and career progression is a central feature of Weber’s ideal 
type bureaucracy. It is a key factor distinguishing developmental states, which tend to 
have meritocratic bureaucracies, from patrimonial states, where bureaucratic 
recruitment and promotions are almost always based on personalized ties (Evans, 
1992; Leftwich, 1995; Grindle, 2012).  The absence of meritocratic recruitment in the 
bureaucracy is associated with producing public administrations that are inflated, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Studies have, however, argued that differences in levels of bureaucratic expertise within countries leads 
to different political-bureaucratic relations across difference ministries within a country (e.g. Costello 1996). 
13 Costello (1996) shows how access to external funding produced differences in levels of bureaucratic 
autonomy in Tanzania.   
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inefficient, corrupt, and lacking in autonomy from political leaders. It is the absence 
of meritocratic recruitment in many developing countries that is the most prominent 
feature of a collusive model of political-administrative relations. 
A principal means of ensuring meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is through 
a civil service entrance examination. This entrance exam, together with the prestige 
associated with employment in the civil service, enabled developmental regimes to 
recruit the countries’ best graduates (Evans, 1992). This is a key factor in the high 
levels of bureaucratic autonomy and influence in policymaking. In contrast, many 
states, particularly in Latin America, have tended not to have formal civil service 
entrance exams (Grindle, 2012; Parrado and Salvador, 2011). Instead most positions 
in the bureaucracy are ‘assigned on the basis of political affiliation, social class, 
ethnic group, nepotism or family connections’ (Meacham, 1999: 282). This, in turn, is 
linked to a lack of bureaucratic autonomy.  
Having civil service exams, however, does not necessarily ensure that recruitment 
into the bureaucracy is meritocratic. As Evans and Raunch (2000: 53) note, ‘exams 
and other credentials may not select for relevant skills but instead may function 
mainly as barriers to entry that shield incumbent officials from competition from 
qualified outsiders.’ Furthermore, there may be some conflict between achieving 
more representative bureaucracy and seeking to achieve meritocracy through civil 
service exams (see below). 
In addition to recruitment being meritocratic, it is also important that career 
progression in the bureaucracy is based on performance rather than political loyalty. 
This is a crucial area where political interference can restrict bureaucratic autonomy, 
and tends to be a central characteristic of intrusive political-bureaucratic relations 
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(Ayee, 2013). In India, for example, civil servants are provided constitutional 
protection against unfair dismissal by ministers, and so the main way politicians assert 
their control over the bureaucracy is by assigning and transferring civil servants to 
posts of varying importance, often based on caste affinity (Iyer and Mani, 2012).  
While the extent to which positions in the bureaucracy are filled by political 
appointment tends to be associated with political control over the bureaucracy, 
political appointments are not necessarily made on the basis of political loyalty 
(Everest-Phillips, 2013). Recent analyses of successful reforms in developing 
countries show that political appointments can be important for reform success where 
there is bureaucratic resistance to change or where there is a lack of expertise on a 
specific policy area within the bureaucracy (Grindle, 2004; Melo et al., 2012). In such 
cases, political appointments can help to produce more collaborative political-
bureaucratic relations around a reform process. 
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that recent decades have seen the expansion of 
educational programs in public administration and public policy, which have been 
geared towards promoting more meritocratic bureaucracies (Hajnal, 2003). While 
these formative activities initially took place in Western countries, they have rapidly 
been adopted by many developing countries (Sabharwal and Berman, 2013). Despite 
this trend, little is known about how these programs have affected the performance of 
public servants (Newcomer, Allen and Baradei, 2010; Lewis, 1987). 
Representation 
A key issue shaping and reflecting political-bureaucratic relations is representation – 
especially representation in the bureaucracy. The issue of representation is not 
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exclusive to developing countries; within political science research more generally 
there has been much focus on the extent to which bureaucracies should reflect the 
interests, views, needs, goals and values of the general public in the policy process 
(Pitkin, 1967; Keiser et al., 2002). However, the issue of representative bureaucracy is 
arguably of more consequence in developing countries, where weak political 
institutions combined with ethnic divisions can hinder development and increase the 
risk of violent conflict (Stewart, 2000).  
Much of the focus on the issue of representative bureaucracy has considered the 
extent to which ensuring a demographic group is represented in the makeup of a 
country’s bureaucracy fosters a decision-making process that benefits the group 
through removing discriminatory boundaries (Mosher, 1982). Research on 
bureaucratic representativeness, both in terms of ethnicity and gender, has generally 
found that there is little to suggest that greater numerical representative in the 
bureaucracy impacts policy outcomes (Subramaniam, 1967; Dresang, 1974; Goetz, 
1998; Burnet, 2008).  
Political and bureaucratic representativeness – both in terms of gender and ethnic 
representation – is found to have important symbolic value in terms of shaping public 
perceptions and attitudes. Burnet (2008), for example, finds that the greater 
representation of women in Rwanda’s political system has transformed public 
perceptions about the role of women in society. Dresang (1974) argues the 
representation of different ethnic groups in newly independent Zambia was important 
for avoiding ethnic divisions in Zambian politics.  
Politicians in countries divided along ethnic lines may use employment in the 
bureaucracy as a means of asserting their control – both over the bureaucracy and 
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over politics in the country more generally. In Trinidad and Guyana, for example, 
ethnic divisions in politics have meant that employment in the public sector is 
dependent on which ethnic group happened to be in power, which is found to 
negatively impact public sector performance (Brown, 1999). The consequences of 
political influence over civil service employment along ethnic lines can have more 
damaging consequences. Indeed, it is seen as a core component of ‘horizontal 
inequalities’ – inequalities between culturally formed groups – and is associated with 
more risk of violent conflict, as has been the case in Rwanda and Sri Lanka in the 
1990s (Stewart, 2000; Uvin, 1998). Hence, issues of representation can be an 
underlying factor in producing more intrusive relations between politicians and 
administrators.  
As such, while there has been some debate over whether seeking to ensure a 
bureaucracy is representative on the basis of ethnicity can undermine the development 
of a meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracy, ethnic representation in the 
bureaucracy has been an important part of state-building in newly independent nations 
(Enloe, 1978). Indeed, the development success of countries such as Botswana and 
Mauritius is seen in part as being due to developing a ‘politically independent state 
bureaucracy with personnel policies based largely on merit, but with a composition 
that is reasonably representative of their societies’ (Carroll and Carroll, 1997: 470). 
Values, interests and motivations 
The relationship between political and bureaucratic elites shapes, and is shaped by, 
the values, interests and motivations of each set of actor. Detailed analysis of 
motivations of government elites has been an area of neglect in development research 
and policy, as the mainstream development community has been ‘guided by an almost 
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religious belief in self-interest as an explanation for human behavior’ (Tendler, 1997: 
5). This emphasis on self-interest has meant that there is relatively little research that 
directly examines the role of values and how values and interests influence public 
attitudes and motivations in developing countries. 
In contrast, the desire to help society and its citizens (Perry and Wise, 1990) has been 
a key area of research in the field of public administration (Bozeman and Su, 2015). 
Interest in public service motivation has, in fact, been growing over the past decade, 
in part because ‘researchers have long shown how important unselfish motivational 
components like loyalty, identification, and good-spirited cooperation are in 
overcoming collective action problems, such as free-riding, moral hazards, and 
opportunism’ (Vandenabeele et al., 2014: 780). Yet, while public sector motivation 
was initially observed among politicians, it was soon argued that this subset of values 
and attitudes towards the common good was not unique among politicians, nor among 
public servants. Instead, it was a motivational disposition that could be found in any 
individual, regarding their country of origin or the working sector (Brewer and 
Selden, 1998; Wise, 2000). 
Arguably, one of the most important questions that future research on governance in 
development needs to consider is how and why is there an esprit de corps among 
politicians and bureaucrats directed towards promoting development in some 
countries and what prevents the creation of these shared developmental values and 
objectives in other countries? It is these shared values and objectives that lie at the 
heart of the collaborative political-bureaucratic relations in developmental states. The 
literature on developmental states points to a number of different factors. One factor 
is the background of political and bureaucratic elites. The shared class background of 
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political and bureaucratic elites facilitated the formation of shared values and 
objectives in many developmental states. The slide towards intrusive relations in India 
was, in part, due to the change in the makeup of politicians. While shortly after 
independence, Indian politicians tended to come from the same elite background as 
senior civil servants, over time politicians often came to more closely represent 
poorer, rural constituents, which contributed to growing distrust between politicians 
and bureaucrats (Turner and Hulme, 1997). 
Another background factor emphasized in the literature on developmental states, such 
as Japan and South Korea, is the informal networks that were created at elite 
universities and secondary schools, which political and bureaucratic elites attended, 
which help to promote collaborative relations. (Evans, 1992).14 A more recent study 
by Jones et al. (2014) demonstrates how the key reform coalitions in Ghana in the 
1980s and 1990s emerged from student organizations and study groups at the 
University of Ghana in the 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast, informal networks 
based on kin, ethnicity, or region, is seen to have prevented the formation of a 
development-oriented ethos among politicians and bureaucrats in many countries.15 
The formation of an esprit de corps between political and bureaucratic elites is not 
exclusively shaped by such background factors. In many cases, it is the result of 
political action. Political leadership is crucial for avoiding widespread corruption in 
the bureaucracy; where the political leadership is corrupt it is almost inevitable that 
the bureaucracy will be afflicted by systematic corruption (Dwivedi et al., 1989; 
Hyden et al., 2003). The importance of political leadership goes beyond avoiding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In his influential account of the Japanese developmental state, Johnson (1982) emphasizes the 
importance of the gakubatsu, the ties among classmates from elite universities. 
15 For example, see Turnbull’s (2002) discussion of the negative impact of personalized ties between 
political and bureaucratic elites in the Solomon Islands.	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corruption. Studies on developmental states, such as Singapore, emphasize the way in 
which political leaders actively sought to promote values based on public service, 
nation-building, and development in the bureaucracy (Saxena, 2011). This was done 
in a number of ways, such as setting up civil service education centers and 
encouraging bureaucrats to participate in civic projects. 
Other political and development factors are also important. For example, political 
continuity in developmental states – either due to the country being autocratic or 
because one political party continually won national elections – helped to develop 
shared values and objectives over a long period of time (Leftwich, 1995). However, 
this is true of party-based rather than personalistic regimes. In personalistic systems, 
such as Zimbabwe, continuity has typically led to more collusive and predatory 
system. Political ideology is another important factor. Tensions can arise between 
politicians and bureaucrats due to differences in political ideology, as Costello (1996) 
discusses in the case of Tanzania. In many developmental states, political leaders 
avoided framing reforms on the basis of left-right political spectrum, and instead 
emphasized a pragmatic developmental ideology. This is also noted in studies of 
successful reforms in developing countries (Melo et al., 2012). In many contexts, this 
economic success reinforced an ‘ideology of developmentalism’ among the political 
and bureaucratic elites, as Charlton (1991) explains in the Botswana case.  
There are also organizational and individual level factors that can shape motivations 
among politicians and bureaucrats, and the creation of a shared developmental ethos. 
Public policy studies suggest that a key determinant of bureaucratic motivations is the 
characteristics of the specific ministry or agency a bureaucrat works for (Dunleavy, 
1991). Individual level factors linked to organizational characteristics are also 
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important, including career progression, influence and wage levels, which impact 
motivations and performance.  
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The significant academic research on political-administrative relations has tended to 
focus almost exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies. There has been an 
absence of attention given to how the nature of political-bureaucratic relations in 
developing countries, and how these might shape the development process. Yet the 
way politicians and bureaucrats engage with one another is increasingly recognized as 
a key area for understanding the politics and governance of reform in developing 
countries. The lack of attention to this issue has meant that much of our understanding 
of the politics-bureaucracy relationship in these countries is based on the relationship 
observed in advanced democracies. This ignores the significant differences between 
richer and poorer nations in terms of institutional development and governance 
structures. As a result, development policy has too often taken a ‘best practice’ 
approach to governance (Andrews, 2012), where donors and other development 
organizations have sought to address the failure to improve public services and 
development outcomes by trying to transfer governance institutions from developed 
nations to developing country contexts (Andrews, 2013; Levy, 2014). The failure of 
efforts at wholesale governance reform has spurned much of the recent literature on 
reforms in developing countries and, more generally, has prompted the recent 
‘political turn’ in development research and policy (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013; 
Hudson and Dasandi, 2014).  
This paper brings together this work in a broad framework to provide the basis for 
more systematic research on the politics-bureaucracy interface in development.  In 
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doing so, the paper has offered two contributions. First, we have discussed a typology 
of political-bureaucratic relations. Specifically, we draw on the concepts of 
separation and autonomy (Svara, 2006) to analyze the main different types of 
relations that politicians and bureaucrats can have. According to this, we have 
outlined four models of political-bureaucratic relations: collaborative, collusive, 
intrusive, and integrated. We have also analyzed the main characteristics of each 
model, and provided an overview of how change occurs in these types of relations. 
Second, it has identified the key factors associated with the political-bureaucratic 
interface in a development context. These factors are resources; recruitment and 
career progression; representativeness; and values, interests and motivations. 
We have elaborated different models of political-bureaucratic relations in developing 
countries. We have not, however, provided a detailed analysis of these models in 
specific country cases, or examined in any detail the link between specific models of 
political-administrative relations and development outcomes. As such, there are 
several key avenues of future research that follow from this paper. One area is a 
greater focus on comparative analysis, as much of the existing research on the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is country specific. Another 
important area of future research is how political-bureaucratic relations can change 
and what the drivers of this change are. This paper offers the basis for such future 
research, and provides an entry point for scholars and development policymakers to 
better understanding the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in 
developing countries.  
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TABLE 1. Typology of political-bureaucratic relations 
 Autonomy of bureaucrats 
Low High 
Separation of 
political and 
bureaucratic 
spheres 
High 
Intrusive 
(e.g. India, Ghana) 
Integrated 
(e.g. UK, USA) 
Low 
Collusive 
(e.g. Zimbabwe, Mexico) 
Collaborative 
(e.g. Singapore, China) 
 
 
